This study examines feedback provided by an English teacher to Chilean secondary student texts, in the context of writing short stories collaboratively in an English as a foreign language class. The study aimed to analyze students’ decisions about the teacher’s types of feedback on their short stories. For this investigation, and under the context of qualitative research, there were analyzed 6 consecutive drafts of the students’ short stories, of a public high school in Chile. This is a qualitative research with (...) an action research design. The data collected was analyzed using Straub and Lunsford categories to describe the impact of the teacher’s written feedback on students’ decisions. In terms of students’ decisions, participant students adopted most of the teacher’s comments. The student’s texts evidenced progress, but still, regardless the feedback provided, they presented some grammatical and organizational issues. (shrink)

In this paper, we argue that there are epistemic norms on evidence-gathering and consider consequences for how to understand epistemic normativity. Though the view that there are such norms seems intuitive, it has found surprisingly little defense. Rather, many philosophers have argued that norms on evidence-gathering can only be practical or moral. On a prominent evidentialist version of this position, epistemic norms only apply to responding to the evidence one already has. Here we challenge the orthodoxy. First, we argue that (...) there is no significant normative difference between responding to evidence you have and gathering more evidence. Second, we argue that our practices of epistemically criticizing agents for their poor evidence-gathering indicate the existence of epistemic norms on evidence-gathering. Finally, we show that our thesis has important implications for recent debates about the relationship between epistemic norms and inquiry. (shrink)

This article is an edited transcript of the roundtable entitled “What is Philo-Performance?” that took place in Paris on 28 June 2014, within the framework of the “Theatre, Performance, Philosophy International Conference: Crossings and Transfers in Anglo-American Thought”. The conference was organized by Julien Alliot, Flore Garcin-Marrou, Liza Kharoubi and Anna Street from the LAPS, a French research group on performance philosophy.

Beliefs can be resistant to evidence. Nonetheless, the orthodox view in epistemology analyzes beliefs as evidence-responsive attitudes. I address this tension by deploying analytical tools on capacities and masking to show that the cognitive science of evidence-resistance supports rather than undermines the orthodox view. In doing so, I argue for the claim that belief requires the capacity for evidence-responsiveness. More precisely, if a subject believes that p, then they have the capacity to rationally respond to evidence bearing on p. Because (...) capacities for evidence-responsiveness are fallible and may be masked, beliefs can be held in the face of counter-evidence. Indeed, I will argue that our best science of belief supports the claim that evidence-resistant beliefs result from masks on evidence-responsiveness capacities. This account of belief not only allows for resistance to evidence, but provides us with a framework for describing and explaining actual cases of evidence-resistance. (shrink)

Delusions are standardly defined as attitudes that are not amenable to change in light of conflicting evidence. But what evidence do people with delusion have for and against it? Do delusions really go against their total evidence? How are the answers affected by different conceptions of evidence? -/- This chapter focuses on how delusions relate to evidence. I consider what delusions-relevant evidence people with delusions have. I give some reasons to think that people typically have evidence for their delusions, and (...) that the evidence they have against them is often overstated. I draw on this discussion to consider whether delusions are evidentially supported and epistemically rational. Finally, I discuss implications for the nature of delusion, responsibility, and treatment and suggest directions for future research. Throughout, the discussion is sensitive to different conceptions of evidence and rationality in epistemology. -/- A central upshot is that what we should say about the epistemic standing of delusions depends substantively on our positions in epistemology, in particular, on the debate between internalists and externalists about evidence. If we want clarity on the epistemic standing of delusions, we need to incorporate more sophisticated tools from epistemology. (shrink)

Resumen El propósito de este trabajo es profundizar en el concepto de actividad de imagen y defender su utilidad como categoría de estudio para comprender diferentes tipos de comportamiento que afectan a la imagen social de los hablantes en la interacción comunicativa: cortesía, descortesía y actividad de autoimagen. Teniendo como base estudios sociopragmáticos del español desde una perspectiva cultural y estudios teóricos en inglés de la última década, se tratará el concepto de actividad de imagen, el cual se caracteriza de (...) acuerdo con dos conceptos claves: el del efecto social que un comportamiento comunicativo tiene sobre las imágenes de los hablantes y el del continuo social, la conexión que se establece entre sus imágenes en la interacción. De esta forma, se propone tratar la actividad de imagen desde dos perspectivas relacionadas: la de la dirección seguida por el efecto social hacia los interactuantes y la de las características de este efecto, siendo su interrelación el factor que permite identificar y caracterizar el tipo de actividad de imagen. (shrink)

Review of Flores-Júnior, O. La vie facile. Une lecture du cynisme ancien, Paris, Librairie philosophique J. Vrin. (2021).

Delusions are deeply evidence-resistant. Patients with delusions are unmoved by evidence that is in direct conflict with the delusion, often responding to such evidence by offering obvious, and strange, confabulations. As a consequence, the standard view is that delusions are not evidence-responsive. This claim has been used as a key argumentative wedge in debates on the nature of delusions. Some have taken delusions to be beliefs and argued that this implies that belief is not constitutively evidence-responsive. Others hold fixed the (...) evidenceresponsiveness of belief and take this to show that delusions cannot be beliefs. Against this common assumption, I appeal to a large range of empirical evidence to argue that delusions are evidence-responsive in the sense that subjects have the capacity to respond to evidence on their delusion in rationally permissible ways. The extreme evidence-resistance of delusions is a consequence of powerful masking factors on these capacities, such as strange perceptual experiences, motivational factors, and cognitive biases. This view makes room for holding both that belief is constitutively evidence-responsive and that delusions are beliefs, and it has important implications for the study and treatment of delusions. (shrink)

The orthodox view in epistemology is that belief is constitutively evidence-responsive. I offer a novel argument for a version of this view, one that appeals to capacities to rationally respond to evidence. I do so by developing the Sellarsian idea that the concept of belief functions to mark the space of reasons in a non-intellectualist and naturalistic direction. The resulting view does justice to the role of belief in social interactions, joint deliberation, and rational persuasion, while including evidence-resistant beliefs and (...) animal beliefs as genuine beliefs. It has a range of further benefits: it helps us account for epistemic normativity, paves the way for better psychological models of belief revision, distinguishes beliefs from imaginings and mere acceptances, and helps us avoid noxious simplistic takes on human irrationality. (shrink)

This article comprises an up-to-date critical review of the field known as Economic Methodology or Philosophy of Economics (EM/PE). Two edited volumes (Kincaid and Ross 2021; Heilmann and Reiss 2021), a special issue of the Journal of Economic Methodology (2021), and a recent bibliometric analysis of the field (Claveau et al. 2021) constitute the basis of the review. Drawing on these sources, we identify a number of problematic trends in current EM/PE research. We claim that these trends could be interpreted (...) as two kinds of biases, namely a micro-level bias and a mainstream bias. We discuss the respective details of these biases and their normative implications for the discipline. (shrink)

This text seeks to introduce a question related to the place that philosophy occupies within the contemporary scene, thus opening a problematization regarding whether it can respond to the demands imposed on it by the present. In this regard, we seek to rethink the notion of philosophy from a standpoint that rescues its practical, material, and affective dimensions, making visible the transformative impulse that it can have with respect to the usual meanings associated with disciplinary production linked to the traditional (...) division between theory and practice, thus opening it to a dimension that recognizes the implicating (creative, interventional) role that philosophy has in the production of reality. (shrink)

We reply to a comment by Hargrave and Smith on a paper in which we use Ostrom’s design principles to develop theory about stakeholder governance. We agree with most of the issues that Hargrave and Smith raise, but disagree with their statement that the systems view of stakeholder governance that they advocate stands in contrast to our approach. The two approaches are complementary.

In this paper I draw on Einstein's distinction between “principle” and “constructive” theories to isolate two levels of physical theory that can be found in both classical and (special) relativistic physics. I then argue that when we focus on theoretical explanations in physics, i.e. explanations of physical laws, the two leading views on explanation, Salmon's “bottom-up” view and Kitcher's “top-down” view, accurately describe theoretical explanations for a given level of theory. I arrive at this conclusion through an analysis of explanations (...) of mass—energy equivalence in special relativity. (shrink)

Bioethics emerged as a discipline in the 70s of the last century. One of its main objectives has been to analyze clinical cases that pose moral problems. This analysis is generally carried out by a multidisciplinary group, the Health Care Ethics Committee, which is comprised of ethical experts or healthcare providers assisted by a facilitator, depending on the context. Different methodologies are used in these situations. The deliberative method, in its various configurations, is the most widely used in many Committees. (...) Identify whether the deliberative method is included in regulated undergraduate and postgraduate teaching; analyze whether a single model can be identified or whether there is heterogeneity in the proposals. A bibliographic review was carried out, following the scoping review method. With respect to the first objective, there is no evidence on the teaching and use of the deliberative method in the Faculties and Schools of Medicine and Nursing, the emphasis is placed on training oriented to the resolution of clinical cases and a certain deliberative proposal is developed from them, more pragmatic than ethical-philosophical. In relation to the second objective, differences are observed between the two most prevalent schools (D. Gracia and B. Molewijk), with the model proposed by Gracia being used more in the Spanish-speaking world, and Molewijk's model in the English-speaking world. It can be seen that D. Gracia's proposal is more philosophical and Molewijk's more pragmatic. Finally, it is considered pertinent to further disseminate the deliberative method and its advantages, as well as its potential for bioethics education. (shrink)

This article develops a characterization of the postmodern subject having as pre-text the film Lost in Translation by Sofia Coppola. To accomplish this goal, the essay links the semiotics of passion and the role of discursive manifestation in the construction of place through the recognition of the “sensitive body” while creating a cinematic experience. This experience transforms the urban space in a lived city and makes possible the encounter with the other and with the self. During the passional journey, contemporary (...) subjectivity displays through sensitive dimensions that are to be interpreted through non-verbal semiotics; and paradise becomes the poetic habitation of the lived space. (shrink)

In this article the author, in a context in which principles and the principle of proportionality are at the heart not only of jurisprudence but also of constitutional and human rights interpretation, claims that when there were those ready to raise the hand to declare a unanimous winner, some critics and skeptics appeared. In addition, to the traditional objections, they worry that proportionality invites to doing unnecessary balancing between existing rights, inventing new rights out of nothing at all (in detriment (...) of those already well-established ones), and even worse in doing so balancing some rights away. In order to answer to such objections and to reject them, as well as to reinforce the importance of this development, the author: first, revisits the constitution of principles and of the principle of proportionality, which per definitio contradicts each one of this objections; and, then, restates the constitution of the principle of proportionality as a principle of principles not only in constitutional and human rights interpretation but also in legislation, including constitutional reformation, and adjudication.Resumen:En este artículo el autor, en un contexto en el cual los principios y el principio de proporcionalidad están en el corazón no solamente de la filosofía y teoría del derecho sino además de la interpretación en materia constitucional y de derechos humanos, argumenta que cuando había quienes estaban listos para levantar la mano para declarar a un ganador unánime, algunos críticos y escépticos aparecieron. Aunado a las objeciones tradicionales están preocupados por que en su opinión el principio de proporcionalidad invita a hacer un balanceo innecesario entre derechos existentes, a inventar nuevos derechos de la nada (en detrimento de los ya bien establecidos), y que al hacer el balanceo se pierdan derechos. Para responder a tales objeciones y rechazar las mismas, así como reforzar la importancia del desarrollo, el autor: primero, revisita la constitución de los principios y del principio de proporcionalidad, la cual per definitio contradice cada una de las objeciones; y, luego, reestablece la constitución del principio de proporcionalidad como un principio de principios no sólo en la interpretación en material constitucional y de derechos humanos sino también en la legislación, incluida la reforma constitucional, y en la adjudicación. (shrink)

Education as object of inquiry is susceptible to multiple interpretations, which -most of them- run the risk of falling only in the understanding of structural factors or in internalist aspects. Reason why one feels like exploring routes that do not engage in a determinist paradox of the type: soci..

Mi propuesta versa sobre ciertas condiciones de posibilidad cognitivas y antropológicas que tratan de las ciencias naturales. En este sentido, la imaginación desempeña un papel fundamental en el origen de las ciencias. Sin embargo, el debate filosófico acerca de este tópico es insuficiente. Defino "imaginación científica" como una ensoñación sofisticada, controlada por la razón y la experiencia (o los experimentos), cuyo papel es producir nuevos objetos científicos. Hay tres tipos de imaginación científica: vaga, operacional y exacta. La primera concierne las (...) metáforas y las analogías. La segunda versa sobre los modelos en el sentido de representaciones imaginarias que simplifican e idealizan la realidad. La tercera es acerca de los modelos en el sentido matemático estricto. Finalmente, la imaginación científica está conectada con el mundo de la vida cotidiana. Así, el observador científico es un observador encarnado y, en consecuencia, su corporalidad provee las percepciones que son necesarias para la imaginación. (shrink)

Callosidad cerebral -- Odiseo y Dédalo -- Tántalo, Sísifo e Ixión -- Tiresias, Calígula y Edipo -- El jugador, Sansón y Butes -- Sócrates y Merlín -- La caña Pesante.

In this article the author focuses mainly in the last part of Ronald Dworkin´s Justice for Hedgehogs and in his argument for a partnership conception of democracy. For that purpose, first, he recalls some of the main features that Dworkin had advanced in previous but intrinsically related works, about political morality, equality and democracy; second, he reassess the arguments for a partnership conception of democracy; third, he reconsiders the resistance produced by Jeremy Waldron in his “A Majority in the Lifeboat” (...) and the response provided by Dworkin, but since it may appear insufficient, he intends to present an alternative —or complemen- tary— riposte in order to meet Waldron’s challenge; and, finally, he insists in the importance of taking Ronald Dworkin seriously.Resumen:En este artículo el autor se enfoca principalmente en la última parte de Justice for Hedgehogs (Justicia para erizos), de Ronald Dworkin y en su argumento a favor de la concepción asociativa o societaria de democracia. Para tal propósito, primero, recuerda algunas de las características centrales que Dworkin ha adelantado en obras anteriores, pero intrínsecamente relacionadas, acerca de moralidad política, la igualdad y la democracia; segundo, reevalúa los argumentos a favor de la concepción asociativa o societaria de democracia; tercero, reconsidera la resistencia producida por Jeremy Waldron en su “A Majority in the Lifeboat” (“Una mayoría en el bote salvavidas”), y la respuesta ofrecida por Dworkin, pero toda vez que puede parecer insuficiente, trata de presentar una respuesta alternativa —o complementaria— para responder al reto de Waldron. Finalmente insiste en la importancia de tomar a Ronald Dworkin seriamente. (shrink)

Epistemic permissivism is the view that it is possible for two people to rationally hold incompatible attitudes toward some proposition on the basis of one body of evidence. In this paper, I defend a particular version of permissivism – unacknowledged permissivism (UP) – which says that permissivism is true, but that no one can ever rationally believe that she is in a permissive case. I show that counter to what virtually all authors who have discussed UP claim, UP is an (...) attractive view: it is compatible with the intuitive motivations for permissivism and avoids a significant challenge to permissivism: the arbitrariness objection. (shrink)

In a time of globalization, Political Philosophy for the Global Age provides a theoretical basis for the convergence of human values in terms of legitimate conceptions of time, language, and notions of self. Sánchez Flores reviews what she considers to be the most important positions in the current debate on political theory (liberalism, communitarianism, feminism, and postcolonialism) and also proposes her own original contribution. Sánchez Flores’s unique approach is a critique of a type of morality formulated solely on (...) the basis of the Judeo-Christian view of reality. It is a theoretical construct that becomes an invitation to explore other notions of human morality and an inquiry into the need to produce a political philosophy that universalizes an ethics of caring and responsibility as well as provides a locus where diverse human cultures can meet. (shrink)

Esta pesquisa tem como objetivo principal mostrar como a ética das virtudes aristotélica pode ser universalizada a partir da ideia de inteligibilidade ética de MacIntyre. Os capítulos deste trabalho visam explicitar, a partir dos escritos de Aristóteles na Ética a Nicômacos, o exercício das virtudes morais como indispensáveis para a realização agir bem e; demonstrar como as condições de inteligibilidade ética de MacIntyre, além de se transformar no elo de ligação conceitual entre a ideia de agir e a ideia de (...) narrativa, contribuem para pensarmos na teoria aristotélica como uma teoria do agir bem que pode ser cósmica e universal. (shrink)

Este texto propone una defensa de la crítica que Cohen realiza al concepto de propiedad de uno mismo. Para ello, presentaremos la crítica de Cohen a dicho concepto en la obra de Nozick. Luego, se expondrá la defensa elaborada por Mack de la propiedad de uno mismo en la obra de Nozick, por medio de la formulación de lo que denomina “cláusula de propiedad de uno mismo”. Por último, se sostendrá que dicha cláusula no permite superar las críticas de Cohen, (...) debido a que su cumplimiento es compatible con un régimen de propiedad colectiva. (shrink)

En “Acerca de la pregunta: ¿qué significa ilustrar?” de 1784, Mendelssohn sostiene que la ilustración que está conectada con la vocación esencial (wesentlich Bestimmung) del ser humano en tanto que ser humano puede entrar en conflicto no solo con la moralidad –las vocaciones extra-esenciales (außerwesentlichen Bestimmungen)– sino también con la vocación esencial del ciudadano, esto es, como miembro de un Estado. En estos casos, afirma Mendelssohn, es necesario cierto cuidado y precaución, cierta prudencia (Klugheit), en el uso de la ilustración. (...) El presente trabajo tiene como objetivo analizar el significado de esta apelación a la prudencia, por parte de Mendelssohn, como símbolo de una Ilustración que, en su compromiso radical con la humanidad, propone una aguda indagación sobre la “situacionalidad” de la razón y su poder emancipador, en la compleja interacción entre teoría y práctica. (shrink)

Laudato si’, with its articulation of a familial ecology reflecting Francis’s Latin American context, expands the subject of solidarity in Catholic social teaching and thought. Yet, this ecological vision of family fails to attend to the problem of gender subordination latent in Catholic social teaching, including in its approaches to ecology. A vision of solidarity that eradicates gender and ecological subordination must elaborate a familial ecology characterized by both mercy and equality.

Commentary on Pablo Hubacher Haerle’s paper “Is OCD Epistemically Irrational?”. I argue for expanding our assessment of rationality in OCD by considering a wider range of epistemic parameters and how they fit together.

Afshar et al. claim that their experiment shows a violation of the complementarity inequality. In this work, we study their claim using a modified Mach-Zehnder setup that represents a simpler version of the Afshar experiment. We find that our results are consistent with Afshar et al. experimental findings. However, we show that within standard quantum mechanics the results of the Afshar experiment do not lead to a violation of the complementarity inequality. We show that their claim originates from a particular (...) technique they use to analyze their results. In their analysis, they assume a classical concept, that particles have a definite trajectory before detection, thus, they obtain which-way information by particle detection plus path extrapolation by applying momentum conservation. This analysis technique is standard in experimental particle physics. Important discoveries such as the detection of vector bosons have been made through the application of this technique. We note that particle detection plus path extrapolation is a suitable technique within de Broglie-Bohm theory of quantum mechanics. (shrink)

In this article, I examine the conceptual and methodological points of convergence and divergence of two intellectual currents frequently referred to as the decolonial and ontological turns in social and anthropological theory. Salient points considered are the ways both theoretical projects unsettle modernity’s dominant ontological and epistemological foundations by seriously engaging the conceptual potential of thinking with alterity (ethical dimension) and from exteriority (geopolitical dimension). I compare their subversive methodological contributions, examining, in particular, Enrique Dussel’s analectical hermeneutic approach and Eduardo (...) Viveiros de Castro’s ethnographic method of controlled equivocation. Lastly, I discuss how both theories and approaches complement each other’s efforts to destabilize Western modernity’s philosophical and anthropological foundations. (shrink)

In this article, I offer a methodological analysis of the empirical research on the causal effects of trade liberalisation, and assess whether such studies can be of any use for guiding policy prescriptions in real-world economies. The analysis focuses on the mainstream economic research that has been used to support arguments in favour of trade liberalisation during the last decades. Even though there are empirical results that could be taken as valid evidence for a causal connection between free trade and (...) economic gains, none of the existing evidence licences trustworthy inferences about the policy effectiveness of trade liberalisation reforms in real-world cases. There are three aspects of the empirical literature that make it highly problematic for making reliable policy inferences: (a) the criteria used to define the notion of ‘free trade’, (b) the background assumptions embedded in the econometric techniques used for estimating causal effects, and (c) the widespread desire among academic economists to attain scientific results in terms of universally valid generalisations. The analysis exposes a worrisome mismatch between, on the one hand, the research aims and outcomes of scientific economics and, on the other, the kind of evidence that would be useful for guiding actual policy deliberations. (shrink)

The Golden Rule is (roughly) as follows: treat others as you would have others treat you. Philosophical reactions to it vary; it has both supporters and detractors. In any case, almost nobody who things critically about morality takes the literal version of the Golden Rule seriously, since there are just too many problems with it. To demonstrate this, I will look at a literal version of the Golden Rule espoused by John C. Maxwell, a well-known and influential motivational speaker, and (...) briefly discuss some of the obvious problems that it faces. I will then examine a more sophisticated version of the Golden Rule espoused by philosopher Harry Gensler. While able to overcome some of the problems of the literal Golden Rule, Gensler's version nevertheless shares a common difficulty with it: in both cases, the moral agent is asked to imagine themselves in the place of another. Maxwell things this is easily done, and Gensler asks for vividness and accuracy in this act of imagination. I wish to show that any version of the Golden Rule that takes seriously the need to imagine oneself in the place of another is to ask one to do the impossible, so any versions of the Golden Rule that require this should be rejected. (shrink)

Epistemic agents interact with evidence in different ways. This can cause trouble for mutual understanding and for our ability to rationally engage with others. Indeed, it can compromise democratic practices of deliberation. This paper explains these differences by appeal to a new notion: epistemic styles. Epistemic styles are ways of interacting with evidence that express unified sets of epistemic values, preferences, goals, and interests. The paper introduces the notion of epistemic styles and develops a systematic account of their nature. It (...) then discusses the implications of epistemic styles for central questions in epistemology, in particular, for issues surrounding rational engagement and for the debate between virtue epistemologists and epistemic situationists. (shrink)

A principios del siglo XVII, Johannes Kepler estudió el ojo humano como instrumento óptico. Décadas más tarde, René Descartes propuso un experimento para aproximarse al ojo como si fuese un objeto separado por completo del cuerpo. Tomado como analogía de la cámara oscura, el ojo exterior ayudaría a entender la visión humana, a explicar la refracción de la luz y a modelar mejores instrumentos ópticos. Ese ojo exterior ampliaría asimismo la observación y exploración estética de la luz. El ojo objetualizado, (...) desprendido del cuerpo humano, se convertía en materia de estudio a disposición de un observador todavía completamente corporeizado. En este extrañamiento, el ojo técnico y el ojo orgánico se observan y modelan el uno al otro. (shrink)